What to do about Greece

Greece isn't so much of a headache as it an opportunity for traders. It allows us to step back and think like an economist; evaluating the what ifs of contagion and speculating the fate of the Euro. The task list is complex.

Last week, the Prime Minister successfully passed a confidence vote, but voters outside his elite backing remained angry. Protesting outside government buildings continued, spreads on Greek/Spanish yields widened, and traders sold off on the Euro sending the currency on a decline. The markets are one step ahead, as the value of the Euro rises ahead of key meetings and votes just to show that expectations are rising, only to increase fears about the next step.

The fact is that Greece is and will continue to be a burden on the Euro zone - lower GDP per person coupled with higher government debt as a percent of national GDP. The country is in desperate need of a 12 billion euro life-line loan by mid-July. This, along with a plan for further austerity measures will be the next task for Greece. The Prime Minister and his cabinet must balance the interest of pleasing bond holders and pleasing voters. This battle is essentially the same, as voters, who want to continue life as it once was (living beyond their means) are the major holders of Greek debt.

Contagion is based mainly on fear rather than the actual. Although the euro zone is becoming entangled in the mess of Greece through its Central Bank (a bad bank of debt) and the flows of bail out cash extending a line of dependency, the risks are greater at home. Greek banks will ultimately feel the pain in the event of a default. The National Bank of Greece, Piraeus Bank, and Eurobank EFG, all have 6-8% of capital tied up in Greek government bonds. However, outside banks such as BNP Paribas and Dexia group, have 2-5% of capital in Italian and Spanish bonds. This is a big problem.

Banks within the euro zone and around the world don't have to be tied up in Greek debt specifically. If the balance sheet has Italian, Irish, and Spanish bonds, it is indirectly affected by Greek default or other types of restructuring. Yields will fluctuate in response, as investors display emotion with their dollars. Banks around the world that have holdings in funds that are exposed to European debt face risk. Similar to the financial crisis, in which investment banks struggled to determine counter-party risk -- who the heck owns the stuff? Eventually, the knot becomes too tight to untangle, and we end up with a Lehman style collapse. Not so much the case here. Transparency is much greater with government debt, but still, exposure and contagion fears remain.

Investors are already evaluating exposure. Shares of Dexia Group, a Belgian bank with major holdings of euro zone debt, have declined significantly (down 24% YTD). However, banks like Dexia are insured through credit default swaps. Back in June, Dexia joined other banks to rollover a combined 30 billion euros of Greek debt for an emergency package. On the other hand, taxpayers and public workers have savings in Greece, and they should worry. The people of Greece can begin with tightening their belts so that the government can get on with tackling its fiscal woes.

So, what are the options.

A second bail out will continue the spiral of dependency and will only succeed if its backed by strict austerity measures. Voters even see a second bail out as a continuing problem. Investors will see this as some certainty, but only short term.

In the long run, the euro zone will continue to funnel money through a stabilization fund (essentially a little IMF of their own). Countries need to get away from this. The money just stalls time.

Default will ripple the markets, but will force people to get serious. If this happens, Greece should think about a gradual exit from the euro zone to focus on creating an organic model that will be more sustainable.

Restructuring is the best bet. First, greater privatization should be considered. Already, Greece is selling shares of its ports and an immediate sale of state assets. Second, a private 'bail-out' focused on restructuring debt should occur. Give Germany and the rest of the euro zone a break, and consider this:

SWFs [Sovereign Wealth Funds] have the might and the risk appetite, but do they have the interest? China has repeatedly pledged support to Europe’s periphery, motivated by the prospect of currying favour with Europe in order for its domestic firms to gain greater access to the European markets.

Norway’s sovereign fund—the world’s second largest—also has an interest in the euro area’s speedy recovery, given its home country’s proximity and links to the euro zone. Although the fund largely tracks public equity and bond indexes, it leaves some room for active management. Recent statements from government and fund officials suggest that the fund may use its discretion to buy more euro area peripheral debt. As of the third quarter last year, Norway’s SWF held US$3.9bn in Spanish sovereign debt, its seventh-largest individual bond position. -- Economist Meg, SWFs: the euro zone's white horse? (May 2011)

For now, we wait. Honestly, I enjoy the buzz among my Twitter and Facebook friends as we frantically try to make sense of this mess. Traders will continue to monitor these events, taking pulse of the Euro. In the meantime, the US should prepare for a shift of interest and get its budget deficit under control to show investors that the country is serious about becoming solvent.